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Crawford v. Washington: What Would 
Justice Thomas Do? 
Bradley G. Clary† 
  INTRODUCTION   
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court decided Craw-
ford v. Washington.1 In that case, the Court decided that “tes-
timonial” hearsay cannot be admitted at a defendant’s criminal 
trial over a Confrontation Clause objection unless the declarant 
is now unavailable to the prosecution and the defendant had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about the 
statement.2 The Court overturned its own 1980 decision in 
Ohio v. Roberts, which had ruled that an unavailable witness’s 
statement against a criminal defendant could be admitted at 
trial over a Confrontation Clause objection if the statement 
“bore sufficient indicia of reliability,” defined as meaning that 
the statement “must either fall within a ‘firmly rooted hearsay 
exception,’ or bear ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness.’”3 
The Court in Crawford chastised the Roberts framework as 
“so unpredictable that it fails to provide meaningful protection 
from even core confrontation violations.”4 The Court concluded 
that “[r]eliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, 
concept.”5  
But there is a problem: The Court also said that, “We leave 
for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive defini-
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 1. 541 U.S. 36 (2006). 
 2. Id. at 68. 
 3. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), overruled by Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42. 
 4. 541 U.S. at 63. 
 5. Id. 
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tion of testimonial.”6 Then in footnote 10, the Court, 
“acknowledge[d] the Chief Justice’s objection . . . that our re-
fusal to articulate a comprehensive definition in this case will 
cause interim uncertainty. But it can hardly be any worse than 
the status quo. . . . The difference is that the Roberts test is in-
herently, and therefore permanently, unpredictable.”7 
Is the Court’s new “testimonial” test actually more predict-
able, even over the longer term, if it remains to be defined case-
by-case? The Court in Crawford and its post-Crawford juris-
prudence has labored to define what testimonial means without 
adopting a bright-line test. This essay will briefly examine the 
consequences of that choice to reject a bright-line definition, 
and will suggest that, if the Court wanted predictability, then it 
should have gone with Justice Thomas’s view that, “the Con-
frontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only 
insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materi-
als, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confes-
sions.”8 The direction the Court has gone in recent cases in try-
ing to define “testimonial” itself creates unpredictability.9 
I.  HOW HAS THE COURT TRIED TO DEFINE THE TERM 
“TESTIMONIAL”?   
In Crawford, the relevant out-of-court declaration was the 
defendant’s wife’s statement to police officers that she did not 
see anything in the hands of the victim at the time her husband 
stabbed the victim with a knife.10 The defendant at trial was 
claiming self-defense.11 The wife did not testify live at trial be-
cause of the defendant’s invocation of spousal privilege.12 To re-
fute the self-defense claim, the state offered into evidence the 
wife’s declaration in the form of tape-recorded statements to 
the police.13 The Court concluded that, “[the wife’s] recorded 
statement, knowingly given in response to structured police 
 
 6. Id. at 68. 
 7. Id. at 68 n.10. 
 8. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 9. There are, of course, other important aspects of Crawford. The narrow 
focus of this particular short essay is not meant to suggest that the predicta-
bility issue is the only or overriding question presented by the decision. 
 10. 541 U.S. at 39–40. 
 11. Id. at 40. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition [of the 
term testimony].”14 The Court barred the statement’s use and 
remanded for further proceedings.15 
The next two cases to come before the Court were Davis v. 
Washington16 and Hammon v. Indiana,17 which the Court con-
sidered together. The issue in Davis was the use of a 911 call in 
a criminal trial.18 The defendant was on trial for felony viola-
tion of a domestic no-contact order.19 When the defendant’s girl-
friend failed to testify live, the state put into evidence the re-
cording of the 911 call in which the girlfriend reported an 
assault and named the defendant as the perpetrator in re-
sponse to questions from the 911 operator.20 The defendant ob-
jected to the use of the recording as a violation of his Confron-
tation Clause rights.21 The Court rejected the Confrontation 
Clause objection stating that, “the circumstances of [the girl-
friend’s] interrogation objectively indicate its primary purpose 
was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. 
[The girlfriend] simply was not acting as a witness; she was not 
testifying.”22  
In Hammon, by contrast, the relevant declaration consisted 
of a battery affidavit that the wife of the defendant had hand-
written in response to police officer questioning during investi-
gation of an apparent domestic disturbance.23 The wife did not 
appear at trial.24 So the questioning officer testified as to the 
wife’s conversation and authenticated the affidavit.25 The Court 
ruled that, because the wife’s statement was post-incident “to 
establish events that have occurred previously,”26 the state-
 
 14. Id. at 53 n.4. 
 15. Id. at 69. 
 16. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 17. Id. (indicating that Hammon v. Indiana was consolidated with Davis 
v. Washington for purposes of appeal). 
 18. Id. at 817–19. 
 19. Id. at 819. 
 20. Id. at 817–18. 
 21. Id. at 819. 
 22. Id. at 828. 
 23. Id. at 819–20. 
 24. Id. at 820. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 832. 
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ment was an “obvious substitute for live testimony,”27 and re-
manded the case for further proceedings.28 
The meaning of these three cases was then tested in Mich-
igan v. Bryant, which came before the Court in 2011.29 The is-
sue in Bryant was the admissibility of statements by a gunshot 
victim before he died naming the defendant as the shooter in 
response to police questioning at the scene of the crime.30 One 
potential legal analysis was that the questioning related to a 
completed past event, and thus resembled the excluded testi-
mony in Hammon.31 The other potential analysis was that the 
questioning related to an ongoing emergency, as the shooter po-
tentially still represented a danger to the community, and thus 
resembled the admitted testimony in Davis.32 The Court adopt-
ed the second view, and hearkened back to language in Davis: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police in-
terrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the pri-
mary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circum-
stances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, 
and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.33 
So how should primary purpose be ascertained? The Court 
identified a two-part inquiry. First, there should be an exami-
nation of the objective circumstances of the encounter giving 
rise to the out-of-court declaration.34 Second, there should be an 
examination of “the purpose that reasonable participants would 
have had, as ascertained from the individuals’ statements and 
actions and the circumstances in which the encounter oc-
curred.”35 The Court then discussed some of the factors that 
would be relevant to the inquiries in an on-going emergency 
scenario: 
 Does the case involve a narrow zone of potential victims 
or a larger zone that might cause concern about an ongo-
 
 27. Id. at 830. 
 28. Id. at 834. 
 29. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
 30. Id. at 1150. 
 31. Id. at 1151. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 1154. 
 34. Id. at 1156. 
 35. Id. 
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ing threat to public safety at the time of the out-of-court 
declaration?36 
 Does the case involve use of a weapon, and, if so, what 
kind of weapon (that might again cause concern about an 
ongoing threat to public safety at the time of the declara-
tion)?37 
 What is the medical condition of the declarant at the 
time of the relevant statement, and what does that sug-
gest about the declarant’s ability to form a purpose in 
making the statement?38 
 Who is the interrogator who prompted the out-of-court 
declaration, and what were the “content and tenor of his 
questions”?39 
The Court apparently considered those factors more objec-
tive than the nine “reliability” factors that the Washington Su-
preme Court had employed under the Roberts test in Crawford 
before the Supreme Court granted certiorari and adopted the 
“testimonial” test: 
(1) whether the declarant, at the time of making the statement, had 
an apparent motive to lie; (2) whether the declarant’s general charac-
ter suggests trustworthiness; (3) whether more than one person heard 
the statement; (4) the spontaneity of the statement; (5) whether 
trustworthiness is suggested from the timing of the statement and 
the relationship between the declarant and the witness; (6) whether 
the statement contains express assertions of past fact; (7) whether the 
declarant’s lack of knowledge could be established by cross-
examination; (8) the remoteness of the possibility that the declarant’s 
recollection is faulty; and (9) whether the surrounding circumstances 
suggest that the declarant misrepresented the defendant’s involve-
ment.40 
But is it really accurate to say that the “reliability” factors 
are inherently less predictable than the factors the Court dis-
cussed in Bryant? Whether more than one person heard the 
relevant out-of-court declaration can certainly be ascertained 
objectively. So can whether the declaration contained express 
assertions of past fact. Indeed, courts in assessing the reliabil-
ity factors historically ought to have been engaged effectively in 
the same two-part inquiry that the Court now wants done in 
deciding whether a statement is “testimonial,” i.e. they ought to 
have been examining the objective circumstances of the en-
 
 36. Id. at 1158. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1159. 
 39. Id. at 1162. 
 40. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 661 n.3 (Wash. 2002) (en banc). 
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counter and they ought to have been looking at the purposes of 
the speakers in light of those circumstances. The Court seems 
concerned that in engaging in the analysis for purposes of “reli-
ability,” trial courts in the past could reach, and were reaching, 
too many inconsistent conclusions.41 But if the substitute ap-
proach is to engage in the analysis to ascertain a declaration’s 
primary purpose in the eyes of the interrogator and the now 
unavailable declarant, aren’t trial courts potentially subject to 
the same possible inconsistencies? 
After all, the Court itself in Bryant recognized that both in-
terrogators and victims often have “mixed motives.”42 “Police 
officers in our society function as both first responders and 
criminal investigators. Their dual responsibilities may mean 
that they act with different motives simultaneously or in quick 
succession. . . . Victims are also likely to have mixed motives 
when they make statements to the police.”43 Exactly! And addi-
tionally, as the Court noted in Hammon, “This is not to say that 
a conversation which begins as an interrogation to determine 
the need for emergency assistance cannot, as the Indiana Su-
preme Court put it, ‘evolve into testimonial statements,’ . . 
. once that purpose has been achieved.”44  
Consider the following simple example: A 911 operator 
fields a call late one night. The operator says hello, and the 
caller on the other end of the line says, “Help! He’s breaking 
in.” The operator asks, “Where are you?” The caller says, “1201 
Main Street, Apartment 1.” The operator asks, “What is hap-
pening?” The caller says, “A man is prying open my window.” 
The operator says, “Help is on the way. Stay on the line.” A si-
ren can be heard in the background. The caller says, “He is 
running away.” The operator asks, “Can you describe the man?” 
The caller says, “Yes, I am pretty sure it was my ex-boyfriend, 
Bob, who is mad at me, but I am not sure. It was dark. But he 
was wearing a white T-shirt with the words ‘Save the Envi-
ronment” on it, blue jeans, and a yellow baseball cap. I hope 
you catch him and put him away for a long time. He tried this 
once before and I think he is a dangerous guy.” The operator 
asks, “What did he do the other time?” The caller says, “He 
punched his fist through my window.” The caller later leaves 
town, and is unavailable when Bob is prosecuted for attempted 
 
 41. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63–64 (2006). 
 42. 131 S. Ct. at 1161. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006). 
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break-in. Does the tape of the 911 call get admitted into evi-
dence over a Confrontation Clause objection? 
The conversation at the outset objectively looks like an 
emergency call for help, and resembles the 911 call from Da-
vis.45 Neither the caller nor the 911 operator appears to be 
building a prosecutorial file. But is that objectively clear for the 
entire dialogue? Once the caller says the suspect is running 
away, is the caller pursuing the emergency, or trying to get Bob 
arrested, or both? Is the 911 operator in asking about the other 
incident trying to see if the suspect is a threat to the public at 
large, or instead starting to build a prosecution? Will all or 
most trial courts inexorably come to the same conclusion on a 
Confrontation Clause objection if the definition of testimonial is 
an inquiry into purpose on a case-by-case, declaration-by-
declaration basis? 
II.  WWJTD—WHAT WOULD JUSTICE THOMAS DO?   
Justice Thomas’s view is that a declaration cannot consti-
tute “testimony” unless it is given with a degree of formal so-
lemnity.46 
This requirement of solemnity supports my view that the statements 
regulated by the Confrontation Clause must include “extrajudicial 
statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.” [Citing his 
own opinion in White v. Illinois] Affidavits, depositions, and prior tes-
timony are, by their very nature, taken through a formalized process. 
Likewise, confessions, when extracted by police in a formal manner, 
carry sufficient indicia of solemnity to constitute formalized state-
ments . . . .47 
This view caused him to join the majority opinion in Craw-
ford, presumably because he agreed with the majority that 
“[the wife’s] recorded statement, knowingly given in response to 
structured police questioning, qualifies under any conceivable 
definition [of the term testimony].”48 His view caused him to 
join the Court’s judgment but not its logic in Davis, simply be-
cause the out-of-court declaration in the form of the 911 call 
could not be testimonial.49 His view caused him to dissent from 
the Court’s judgment in Hammon, because, although in his 
 
 45. 547 U.S. at 817–18 
 46. Id. at 836 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 47. Id. at 836–37. 
 48. 541 U.S. at 69. 
 49. 547 U.S. at 840 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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view the wife’s affidavit itself was excludable as “testimony,” 
the informal questions and answers that preceded the affidavit 
were not.50 His view caused him to concur in the Court’s judg-
ment but not in its logic in Bryant, simply because the informal 
questions and answers at the crime scene were not sufficiently 
formal to constitute “testimony.”51  
Interestingly, Justice Thomas’s view ultimately caused him 
to dissent only once in these cases.52 And Justice Thomas’s test 
is easier for both trial and appellate courts to apply. If a trial 
court in the first instance must become embroiled in analyzing 
whether the primary purpose of an out-of-court declaration is 
“testimonial” or not, the inquiry will necessarily be time-
consuming and painstaking, and the trial judge will know that, 
if the defense loses, there is a built-in appeal issue. The appel-
late court will then have to re-analyze the issue to see if the 
trial court got it right. If only formalized testimonial materials, 
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions 
count, then the Confrontation Clause issue is much simpler to 
handle. 
III.  WHAT ABOUT THE LAB REPORT CASES?   
How then do the tests play out when applied to a different 
evidentiary scenario, i.e. the proposed admission of lab reports 
into evidence as against Confrontation Clause objections? If one 
or both tests are workable, they should make sense in multiple 
categories of “testimony.” 
The issue of admissibility of lab reports surfaced post-
Crawford in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.53 In Melendez-
Diaz, police officers seized plastic bags containing material that 
looked like cocaine.54 The state at trial offered certificates from 
the relevant state crime lab attesting that the substance in the 
bags was in fact cocaine.55 Analysts from the lab swore to the 
certificates in front of a notary public, but were not present to 
testify live at trial.56 The defendant objected to the certificates 
 
 50. Id.  
 51. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1167 (2011) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). 
 52. Davis, 547 U.S. at 840–42 (Thomas, J., concurring in Davis, but dis-
senting in Hammon). 
 53. 557 U.S. 305, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 54. Id. at 2530. 
 55. Id. at 2531. 
 56. Id. 
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on the ground that they constituted “testimony” barred by the 
Confrontation Clause unless the analysts testified subject to 
cross-examination.57 A majority of the Court agreed, ruling 
that, “the ‘certificates’ are functionally identical to live, in-court 
testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct exam-
ination.’”58 In fact, said the Court, “under Massachusetts law 
the sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide ‘prima facie ev-
idence of the composition, quality, and the net weight’ of the 
analyzed substance.”59 Justice Thomas joined the majority 
opinion.60 
More recently, lab reports surfaced again at the Court in 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico.61 There, a state crime lab had per-
formed a blood-alcohol analysis on the defendant in support of 
a prosecution for driving while intoxicated (DWI).62 The rele-
vant analyst from the lab completed and certified the analysis, 
reporting that the alcohol content in the defendant’s blood ex-
ceeded the legal threshold.63 But at trial the prosecution put a 
different analyst on the stand to testify to the procedures which 
had been employed as a matter of standard practice.64 The de-
fendant objected on Confrontation Clause grounds, and the 
Court eventually upheld the objection.65 Even though the rele-
vant certificate in Bullcoming was unsworn, it nonetheless was 
sufficiently “formalized” in a “report” to qualify as “testimo-
ny.”66 Justice Thomas joined the pertinent part of the opinion, 
except as to footnote 6 thereof which recited that to be testimo-
nial, “a statement must have a ‘primary purpose’ of ‘estab-
lish[ing] or prov[ing] past events . . . .”67 
Ultimately, therefore, application of the two tests in the lab 
report cases did not produce different results, and Justice 
Thomas’s test is easier to administer. 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 2532 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 61. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
 62. Id. at 2710. 
 63. Id. at 2709. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 2710. 
 66. Id. at 2717. 
 67. Id. at 2709 n.*. 
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IV.  WHAT ABOUT THE FORFEITURE CASES?   
What happens when the two tests are applied to yet anoth-
er different evidentiary scenario, i.e. the potential forfeiture of 
a defendant’s Confrontation Clause objections? If one or both 
tests are workable, then again they should make sense in mul-
tiple categories of “testimony.” 
In Giles v. California,68 the Supreme Court faced the issue 
of whether a criminal defendant forfeits his constitutional right 
of confrontation by procuring the absence of a now unavailable 
witness.69 The defendant in Giles had killed his former girl-
friend.70 His claim was self-defense.71 To rebut that claim, the 
prosecution offered into evidence statements that the girlfriend 
had made to police officers during a separate domestic violence 
investigation three weeks before the killing.72 The lower courts 
accepted the statements on the ground that defendant’s murder 
of the girlfriend prevented her from testifying at trial to the 
prior statements, and thus the defendant had forfeited his 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation right.73 The Supreme Court 
reversed, concluding that California’s broad reading of forfei-
ture doctrine did not exist at the time of the Sixth Amend-
ment’s enactment, and that forfeiture would apply, if at all, on-
ly upon a showing that the defendant killed his girlfriend with 
the intent to prevent her from testifying.74 Because the lower 
courts had not examined that intent, the Supreme Court re-
manded for further proceedings.75 
Justice Thomas joined in the majority opinion, but wrote 
separately to explain his logic.76 In Justice Thomas’s view, the 
former girlfriend’s statements during the domestic violence in-
vestigation were simply not testimonial.77 They instead were 
made informally, and resembled the statements in Hammon 
that caused Justice Thomas to dissent in that case.78 Thus, 
there was no Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause issue 
 
 68. 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
 69. Id. at 355. 
 70. Id. at 356. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 356–57. 
 73. Id. at 357. 
 74. Id. at 377. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 377–78 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 78. Id. 
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present in Giles at all. That said, however, the prosecution in 
Giles had never disputed that the former girlfriend’s state-
ments were testimonial in nature.79 Once that concession exist-
ed, whether the defendant had forfeited his Sixth Amendment 
right was a live issue. And Justice Thomas concluded that the 
majority correctly decided that particular question.80 
Ultimately, then, the two tests did not produce irreconcila-
ble results in Giles. And Justice Thomas’s is easier to adminis-
ter. 
V.  BUT IT REALLY IS NOT THAT SIMPLE, IS IT?   
No, it is not quite that simple. 
One legitimate concern is that a focus on formality to 
achieve predictability potentially would encourage abusive 
practices, i.e. it would encourage police and prosecutors to 
adopt “informal” interrogation precisely to avoid application of 
the test. This is an appropriate worry. Justice Thomas himself 
apparently has considered that possibility for he has written 
that, “Because the Confrontation Clause sought to regulate 
prosecutorial abuse occurring through use of ex parte state-
ments as evidence against the accused, it also reaches the use 
of technically informal statements when used to evade the for-
malized process.”81  
Is that a helpful cross-check? The “when used to evade” 
language sounds like an inquiry into purpose. The point of the 
formalized materials categorical test is in part to avoid inquir-
ies into purpose.  
But if the categorical test is the starting point, then it is 
likely a number of case-by-case scenarios will resolve without 
further ado. Consider, for example, the 911 call category. In the 
run of the mill scenario, will police dispatchers construct 911 
calls “informally” to “evade” Confrontation Clause issues that 
otherwise would have been present had the calls been “formal”? 
That seems doubtful, as they are simply not formal typically 
now, which is why Justice Thomas voted against exclusion in 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 838 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
 
 2012] WHAT WOULD JUSTICE THOMAS DO? 29 
 
Davis.82 At least the categorical test does not commence with a 
purpose inquiry, and that is beneficial.83 
Nonetheless, a case such as Bobadilla v. Carlson84 illus-
trates the potential difficulties. A Minnesota state court con-
victed Bobadilla of sexually assaulting his three-year old neph-
ew.85 Part of the evidence consisted of a recorded interview that 
a social worker conducted of the child to “assist” the police and 
while a police officer was present.86 The interview proceeded 
pursuant to Minnesota Statute § 626.556, which allows social 
workers to interview children in abuse cases in coordination 
with “the local law enforcement agency and local welfare agen-
cy” for the purpose of “protect[ing] children whose health or 
welfare may be jeopardized through physical abuse, neglect, or 
sexual abuse.”87 The child in due course did not testify live at 
trial, but the social worker did, and the trial court allowed the 
jury to see the video of the interview.88 The question on appeal 
in a writ of habeas corpus proceeding was whether the video 
constituted “testimony” for purposes of the defendant’s Con-
frontation Clause rights.89 
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the answer was yes. The 
Court’s logic was that, despite the articulated health and wel-
fare purpose of the Minnesota Statute, the social worker’s in-
terview in the case “is a substitute for, and functions as, the po-
lice interrogation.”90 The “interview consisted of highly 
structured questioning aimed at getting [the child] to repeat, on 
videotape, his allegation of abuse.”91 
 
 82. Id. at 840. 
 83. Another legitimate concern is that the focus on formality to achieve 
predictability simply allows too many un-cross-examined statements directed 
at convicting the accused defendant into evidence even without attempts to 
circumvent formality. After all, at least in theory, fewer out-of-court declara-
tions qualify for exclusion under the narrow definition of “testimonial” in Jus-
tice Thomas’s test than qualify for exclusion under Confrontation Clause ob-
jections in the majority’s test. Whether that has actual practical consequences 
deserves empirical study as the body of post-Crawford court decisions ex-
pands. The above examination of the results in the current Supreme Court 
case law inventory suggests that the answer might be no, but at this point the 
answer is unknown. 
 84. No. 08-3010, 2009 WL 2392182 (8th Cir. Aug. 6, 2009). 
 85. Id. at *1. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at *3; see also MINN. STAT. § 626.556(1). 
 88. Id. at *1–2. 
 89. Id. at *4. 
 90. Id. at *6. 
 91. Id. 
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Would application of Justice Thomas’s test produce the 
same result? The likely answer is yes. The interview in Boba-
dilla was quite structured in nature. A police officer was in at-
tendance. The interview of the child took place at the police de-
partment, after a request for assistance by the police several 
days after the incident.92 
But one can imagine a hypothetical case in which an inter-
view of a child does not take place with an officer present. And 
the interview is not at the police department. And the inter-
view is “coordinated” with a police investigation but is not ex-
actly requested by the police. And the interview is conducted 
only a day or two after the incident. And the interview is not 
video-taped, but the relevant social worker takes almost verba-
tim notes. And the social worker has an outline for questions, 
but not a formal script. If the social worker testifies at trial, 
and repeats the unavailable child’s answers to her questions, 
would the testimony consist of “technically informal state-
ments . . . used to evade the formalized process”? A purpose 
analysis would be needed to decide the question. The only ad-
vantage to Justice Thomas’s test in the hypothetical, therefore, 
would be that the Confrontation Clause inquiry would not start 
with that particularized purpose inquiry. The bright-line for-
malized process test would not resolve simply and neatly all 
Crawford issues. 
  CONCLUSION   
The Court has created a case-by-case debate over the defi-
nition of “testimony” for Confrontation Clause purposes. To the 
extent that the Court objected to the Roberts “reliability” 
framework as creating unpredictability, the Court did not actu-
ally create a more predictable construct. While Justice Thom-
as’s approach does not neatly resolve all Confrontation Clause 
scenarios, it nonetheless starts out more consistently with the 
Court’s articulated reasoning, and will resolve a number of sce-
narios more simply than a case-by-case purpose test does.93 
 
 92. Id. at *5. 
 93. One last question: Does any of this discussion actually matter given 
that ultimately the Court has said, “The unpardonable vice of the Roberts test, 
however, is not its unpredictability, but its demonstrated capacity to admit 
core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to 
exclude”? Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2006). The answer is yes, 
because courts and litigants still have to be able to apply the rule consistently. 
If “reliability” test results were inconsistent, the Court should be trying to re-
duce inconsistency in the replacement “testimonial” test. 
